This 
Introduction
he ac (if a T extent of predictable variation in asset returns is of great interest to ademics and practitioners alike. In practice, evidence of return predictability ny) has obvious implications for traders and funds managers. From an academic perspective, return predictability plays an important role in testing finance theory. Over longer horizons, some degree of return predictability is consistent with modern asset pricing models. In the short run, efficient markets theory has clear implications for the behaviour of returns.
In his seminal work, Fama (1970) defines a market to be weak-form efficient if stock returns cannot be predicted on the basis of past stock prices/returns. To reflect recent developments in empirical work, Fama (1991) widens this definition to encompass return predictability using other variables (such as dividend yield, interest rates and seasonality), as well as cross-sectional predictability. Even the narrow definition, however, has sparked considerable interest and debate.
Weak-form efficiency is often interpreted to mean that stock prices follow a random walk (or a martingale). While there are different versions of the random walk hypothesis (see Campbell, Lo & MacKinlay 1997) , the one tested most often in the literature assumes the increments of the price process (i.e. returns) are uncorrelated. Accordingly, under the random walk null hypothesis, return autocorrelations are zero at all leads and lags. Empirical tests, however, overwhelmingly suggest that returns exhibit non-zero autocorrelation.
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While the non-zero return autocorrelations are statistically significant, doubt remains over the economic significance of return predictability which is often assessed by the profits generated from trading strategies designed to exploit the documented autocorrelation in stock returns. For example, Jegadeesh (1990) and Lehmann (1990) report that monthly and weekly returns respectively exhibit negative first-order autocorrelation, but significant positive autocorrelation at higher lags through to at least 12 months. A price momentum (or 'relative strength') investment strategy involves buying (selling) those stocks that have performed well (poorly) over the prior 6 to 12 months and holding over the horizon for which positive autocorrelation exists (typically, 3 to 12 months). Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) rank stocks according to price momentum measured over the previous twelve months and form a zero-cost arbitrage portfolio by buying the stocks in the best-performing decile and shorting stocks in the worst-performing decile. This price-momentum strategy yields 1.31% per month over the subsequent 3-month holding period. Similarly, a strategy ranking stocks by six-month price momentum earns around 1% per month for all holding horizons up to twelve months.
The Australian literature on the statistical and economic significance of return predictability is less voluminous. Praetz (1969) calculates autocorrelations out to 60 lags on: (i) weekly returns to industry groups and twenty leading stocks over 1958-1966; and (ii) monthly returns on two market indices from . While the first-order autocorrelation on a handful of stocks and industry groups is significantly negative, there are few significant correlations at higher lags. Nonparametric runs tests also fail to detect any dependencies in returns. Praetz (1969, p. 137) concludes that the predictability in returns is 'not widespread, nor large, nor could it be exploited for gain '. Officer (1975) calculates autocorrelations out to lags of 12 months for a sample of 126 stocks having a complete dataset from 1958 to 1970. The mean autocorrelations are negative at lags 1, 2, 4, and 10, and positive at other lags. No autocorrelations, however, are statistically significant leading Officer (1975, p. 38) to conclude that he would be 'hard pressed to reject the random-walk hypothesis for individual shares'. For an equally-weighted index constructed from his 126 stocks, Officer reports large positive autocorrelation in monthly index returns at lags 1, 6, and 9, and large negative autocorrelations at lags 13 and 14. The firstorder autocorrelation is attributed to infrequent trading, while the negative autocorrelation at longer lags is found to have little predictive ability. Brown, Keim, Kleidon and Marsh (1983) report autocorrelations out to lags of 14 months for ten size-ranked portfolios. All size portfolios have statistically significant positive first-order autocorrelation which, like Officer (1975) , is attributed to severe non-trading. Brown et al. also report significant positive autocorrelations at lag 9 and significant negative autocorrelations at lags 13 and 14. Sampling variation is suggested as an explanation for these findings. Groenewold and Kang (1993) examine the autocorrelation structure of returns on four Australian stock-market indices. Using both Ljung-Box and likelihoodratio tests, the null hypothesis that the first 12 lags are jointly zero cannot be rejected. Similarly, using the variance-ratio test of Lo and MacKinlay (1988) , Walsh (1997) finds little evidence of departure from the random walk hypothesis in post-1987 industry and index returns. Finally, Groenewold (1997) reports statistically significant autocorrelations on daily returns to the Statex Actuaries Price Index out to seven lags (days 2 and 6 are negative, while the remainder are positive).
Several characteristics of the Australian equity market differ notably from the larger international markets examined in prior autocorrelation and predictability literature. A small number of companies contribute a significant proportion of the total market capitalisation. On average, therefore, Australian companies are much smaller than their international counterparts. This raises several important issues for any examination of autocorrelation and return predictability in Australia. First, in light of the evidence of a significant Australian small-firm effect, the possibility of differential relationships for large and small stocks must be accommodated. Second, Australian equities are also characterised by infrequent trading. This potentially exposes the analysis to well-known microstucture problems such as spurious autocorrelations and upwardly biased return estimates. Where possible, care must be taken to mitigate the likely effects of these characteristics. This paper has several objectives. First, we estimate the autocorrelation structure of returns on individual Australian stocks. The vast majority of prior Australian studies focus on autocorrelations of market indices and industry groups. If, however, return autocorrelations are significant (i.e. if returns are partially predictable based on past returns), traders are more likely to implement trading strategies with individual stocks.
2 In addition, strong patterns in return autocorrelations of certain stocks (e.g. small v. large stocks) may be obscured when examining market autocorrelations. Our focus on individual stocks necessitates a departure from the time-series methods employed in prior studies. We estimate autocorrelations using Fama and MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regressions. This methodology also allows an examination of differences in the autocorrelation structure of returns attributable to seasonality and firm size.
The second objective is to assess the economic significance of return autocorrelations. Finding statistically significant autocorrelation has few implications for the efficient markets hypothesis if this predictability does not admit profitable investment strategies. We report the profitability of two simple investment strategies based on the autocorrelation structure of stock returns.
Our preliminary results show large negative first-order autocorrelation in monthly returns to Australian stocks. These findings are most pronounced in July and for small-capitalisation stocks. In contrast to U.S. findings, positive autocorrelations at longer lags appear only for large-capitalisation stocks. The results also suggest that the documented autocorrelations are economically significant. Two simple trading strategies appear to yield significant risk-adjusted returns.
Further analysis reveals that the two portfolios central to our trading strategies comprise stocks with small market capitalisations and low share prices. It is wellknown that such stocks are vulnerable to a number market-microstructure-related problems. After revising the dataset to mitigate these problems, little evidence of economic significance remains.
-100 -The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the data employed in the study and details the cross-sectional regression methodology used to estimate the return autocorrelations. Section 3 documents the autocorrelation structure of returns and examines the impact of seasonality and firm size on autocorrelations. The economic significance of return autocorrelations is assessed using two simple trading strategies. Section 4 explores the robustness of findings to a potential survivorship bias and several market microstructure problems. Section 5 concludes the paper.
Data and Methodology
Our data are drawn from the Australian Graduate School of Management (AGSM) price relative file containing monthly returns for all stocks listed on the Australian Stock Exchange during the period December 1973 to December 1998. The population of stocks ranges from 880 in September 1983 to 1,775 in April 1988, with an average of 1,147 stocks per month.
We begin by documenting the intertemporal structure of monthly returns to individual Australian stocks using a methodology similar to Jegadeesh (1990 Jegadeesh (1990) estimates the time t expected return t i, on each stock as the mean monthly return to stock i from t + 1 to t + 60. His results, however, are insensitive to the period over which these means are calculated; four and six year estimation periods produce similar results. Likewise, Jegadeesh gets similar autocorrelation estimates simply using raw returns as the dependent variable. Given the relatively short time period covered by the AGSM database, we estimate expected returns R t i, at each point in time t as the mean monthly return to stock i from t + 1 to t + 36. R 3 When a stock has missing return data during this estimation period (most likely because of non-trading), we calculate the average over the valid return data. However, we only include a stock in the cross-sectional regression if it has at least twenty valid returns during the thirty-six month estimation period. 4 To summarise, at a given point in time, a stock is included in the crosssectional regression if it has valid return data at the appropriate lags specified in model (1), and at least twenty valid returns to estimate its unconditional return. On average, this procedure results in 608 stocks being included in each regression.
The cross-sectional regression model (1) is estimated for each month. Since a 12-month lagged return is included in (1), our first estimation period is January 1975. Likewise, since expected returns are estimated over a period of not less than twenty months, the final regression is estimated in April 1997. This results in 268 cross-sectional regressions. Following Jegadeesh (1990) , we calculate parameter estimates and test statistics using the Fama and MacBeth (1973) The statistical significance of each autocorrelation estimate is examined by forming a test statistic a j /σ j , which has a t-distribution with T-1 degrees of freedom (T = 268).
3. Like Jegadeesh, our estimates change little if we use a shorter estimation period or simply raw returns. In order to avoid look-ahead bias, we rely on the latter finding to omit To test for economic significance, we devise two simple trading strategies based on the observed autocorrelation structure (precise details are given in section 3.2 after presentation of autocorrelations). The returns to the trading strategies gauge the economic significance of autocorrelations. Table 1 reports the autocorrelation estimates from model (1) and the p-value from t-tests that each estimate equals zero. To facilitate interpretation, autocorrelations significantly different from zero at the 5% level or better are presented in shaded cells. For the full sample (Jan-Dec), the pattern in autocorrelations displays similarities with US findings by Jegadeesh (1990) . Namely, autocorrelations at lags 1 and 2 are significantly negative. Also, the (time-series average) adjusted R 2 suggests that lagged returns on average explain around 8% of the cross-sectional variation in individual stock returns (Jegadeesh finds an R 2 of 10%). With the exception of positive autocorrelation at lag 6, the Australian autocorrelations are insignificant at lags 3 through 12. In contrast, Jegadeesh finds significant positive autocorrelations at all lags except lag 8. These differences may impact on the profitability of momentum investing in Australia. Since return autocorrelations appear to die out quicker than US autocorrelations, profitable investment strategies are more likely over shorter horizons. Beyond 6 lags, there is no evidence of predictability. Table 1 also allows an assessment of whether the return predictability is driven by well-known seasonals. Gaunt, Gray, and McIvor (2000) report that, while Australian equity returns in January exhibit a large seasonal component, the July seasonal is even bigger. Thus, we repeat the cross-sectional regressions for January-only months, July-only months, and 'Other' months. Inference is based on the standard errors calculated from the empirical distribution of estimates from the new regressions.
Results

Statistical Significance of Return Autocorrelations
Comparing the estimates for the full sample (Jan-Dec) and Other months, the pattern in autocorrelations is very similar. The first two lags are significantly negative, and most of the remainder are insignificant. The similarity of these estimates suggests that the full-sample results are representative of the whole year and are not driven by anomalous returns in January and/or July.
When we consider the month of January separately, little stands out as being different from Other months. The January first-order autocorrelation is large and negative, and while the remaining autocorrelations are generally larger in magnitude than Other months, all but one (lag 7) are statistically insignificant.
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This finding contrasts with Jegadeesh who reports that the pattern of autocorrelations in January is radically different to Other months. Specifically, Jegadeesh finds that all January autocorrelations up to lag 11 are negative.
While January autocorrelations appear no different to Other months in Australia, the July-only estimates do stand out. The magnitude of the first-order autocorrelation for July is more than double that of Other months. In addition, 8 of 5. The small sample available in Australia may contribute to the lack of power in month-specific tests.
Table 1
Cross-Sectional Regression Estimates
Autocorrelation estimates a j are the time-series average of the cross-sectional estimates from model (1). Standard errors are based on the empirical distribution of estimates. The p-value from a t-test that each estimate equals zero is reported in parentheses (shaded cells represent 5% or better significance levels). the 12 lags are negative, although test statistic power again inhibits strong conclusions. This pattern closely resembles the January autocorrelations of Jegadeesh, hinting that end of tax year considerations may be the cause. It is often argued that stocks which fall during the year are sold off for tax reasons, with the effect of further deflating price (see Brown, Keim, Kleidon & Marsh 1983) . Subsequent buying pressure in July raises the price and generates the negative correlation between June-July returns. In addition to seasonal effects, it is also well-known that the market capitalisation of a stock impacts on its return (see Brown et al. 1983; Gaunt, Gray & McIvor 2000 for Australian findings). To examine the potential impact of firm size on return autocorrelations, we re-estimate model (1) for stocks grouped by market capitalisation. Specifically, for each month, we calculate quintile breakpoints for AGSM stocks with valid data in that month, as well as the required lags for regression (1). The cross-sectional regression is then estimated for each quintile. This process is rolled forward one month and repeated. Table 2 reports return autocorrelations by size quintile. The results suggest distinct patterns in autocorrelations depending on firm size. Quintile 1 (small firms) has significant negative autocorrelations at lags 1 through 5. The magnitude of these estimates is striking, particularly at lags 1 and 2. This finding cannot be attributed to seasonal effects-it prevails in January, July, and Other months. It is worth noting, however, that the autocorrelations over the first four lags in January and July are even larger than the full sample (Jan-Dec) estimates.
Working through table 2, several interesting features emerge. First, as firm size increases, autocorrelations tend from negative to positive. For Quintiles 1, 3, and 5, the number of negative autocorrelations in the first twelve lags are 11, 7, and 1 respectively. The first-order autocorrelations for Quintiles 1 through 5 are -0.1932, -0.0762, -0.0395, -0.0123, and -0.0058 respectively, the last two being insignificant.
Second, for smaller to medium-sized firms, there is little evidence of significant autocorrelation beyond 5 lags. Third, for larger firms, positive autocorrelation dominates. With the exception of lag 1, the full sample results for Quintiles 4 and 5 show no significant negative autocorrelations. The balance of significant autocorrelations is clearly positive and at longer lags.
To summarise, tables 1 and 2 reveal several patterns in return autocorrelation of individual stocks. Most notably, first-order autocorrelations are large and negative, particularly for small stocks and in the month of July. The next task is to assess whether such autocorrelations are economically significant.
Economic Significance of Return Autocorrelations
Statistically significant return autocorrelations should be interpreted with caution. With a sufficiently large sample size, statistical tests can detect even a minor departure from the zero null. Non-zero autocorrelations, however, do not necessarily translate into economically significant trading strategies. In this section, we assess the economic significance of the autocorrelations documented in section 3.1 by evaluating the profitability of two simple trading strategies. The first strategy is designed to specifically test the economic significance of the large negative first-order autocorrelations. Stocks are ranked by their month t return and sorted into decile portfolios. Portfolios 1 and 10 (P1 and P10) contain the worst and best performing stocks respectively in month t. Given negative first-order autocorrelation, P1 (P10) is predicted to perform best (worst) in month t + 1. The month t + 1 return to each portfolio is calculated, and the procedure is rolled forward one month and repeated. The second strategy is designed to test the predictive power of all autocorrelations jointly. The cross-sectional regression (1) is estimated in month t to yield the average autocorrelations. 6 The regression estimates are used to forecast the month t + 1 return for each stock. Decile portfolios are formed with portfolios 1 and 10 (P1 and P10) containing the stocks forecasted to perform best and worst respectively. The month t + 1 performance of these portfolios is calculated, and the procedure is rolled forward and repeated.
Over the January 1975 through April 1997 period, these trading strategies are implemented using 163,018 firm months. The minimum (maximum) number of stocks in each portfolio at a given point in time is 45 (83), with an average of 60 stocks per portfolio per month.
For both strategies, abnormal returns are calculated using two models. First, portfolio returns are adjusted for risk differentials using a market-model style timeseries regression:
where R m,t and R f,t are the returns on the AGSM value-weighted index and the 13-week Treasury note respectively. Second, abnormal returns are calculated using a two-factor model that incorporates a Fama-French (1993) 
where the risk factor SMB is constructed from individual stocks returns in the AGSM database. In each month, stocks are ranked by capitalisation, with the top 200 stocks making up the 'Big' portfolio and the remainder making up the 'Small' portfolio.
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In models (2) and (3), the intercept α p measures the abnormal return to portfolio p, which is zero under the null hypothesis that returns are unpredictable using past returns. To account for contemporaneous correlation between portfolios, models (2) and (3) are estimated as a multivariate system of equations using Hansen's (1982) generalised method of moments. Heteroscedasticity-andautocorrelation consistent standard errors are calculated following the procedure of Andrews (1991).
6. To avoid look-ahead bias, the dependent variable is simply the stock's raw return R i,t . We do not subtract the unconditional expected return t i R , .
7. We are grateful to the referee for suggesting the use of the two-factor model. As an aside, we found the SMB risk factor can be proxied very effectively simply by the difference between the equal and value weighted market indices. Estimates of abnormal returns (not shown) are largely unchanged.
The predictability contained in the autocorrelation structure of stock returns may lead to systematic differences in the performance of the ten portfolios. Specifically, P1 is expected to outperform P10 under each strategy. The magnitude of returns to these portfolios, however, allows an assessment of the economic significance of return autocorrelations. Table 3 reports raw and risk-adjusted returns to portfolios under both trading strategies. Portfolios formed by ranking stocks on prior month returns (Strategy 1) appear to earn economically significant profits. Consistent with the large negative first-order autocorrelation reported in table 1, the portfolio containing the worst performing stocks from the prior month (P1) earns an average of 7.24% in the following month. Using either method of adjusting for risk, P1 still earns over 5% per month. In contrast, the abnormal return of last month's winners (P10) is negative (statistically insignificant/significant using market model/two-factor model). The zero-cost arbitrage portfolio (P1-P10) earns abnormal returns of over 6% per month.
Under Strategy 2, the full set of autocorrelation estimates from model (1) also appear to have some ability to predict one-month-ahead returns. The portfolio of stocks with the best (worst) forecasts earns average returns of 4.90% (1.49%) per month, while a zero-cost arbitrage portfolio earns an average of 3.41%. Adjusting for risk differentials, P1 has an abnormal return of over 3% per month.
In summary, table 3 suggests that a trading strategy simply based on observing prior month stock returns earns abnormal returns over 6% per month. While this return is before transaction costs, and the trading strategy is admittedly transaction intensive, the magnitude is such that economically significant profits are likely to remain even after transaction costs. The following section explores the robustness of these profits to several possible explanations.
Further Exploration of Results
Survivorship Bias
The sample of stocks analysed in the previous section may suffer survivorship bias on a number of fronts.
8 First, at a given point in time t, a stock must have valid returns in that month as well as in each the previous twelve months. Second, a stock must also have a valid return in the month following time t. It is instructive to consider the impact of these filters on both estimated autocorrelations and profits to trading strategies.
The '12 previous months' filter is likely to exclude small stocks that trade infrequently, as well as stocks that delist (due to failure, mergers or takeovers). Excluding failing stocks (whose performance does not turn around) imparts a negative bias on estimated autocorrelations. The impact of excluding non-trading stocks is less clear. Such stocks are likely to be small stocks, and the results for small stocks with a full set of valid returns suggest these stocks have large negative autocorrelations. Therefore, the estimated autocorrelations may also be biased upwards by the exclusion of (small) infrequent traders.
8. We are grateful to the referee for highlighting the potential survivorship bias and suggesting avenues for exploring the likely impact.
Table 3 Raw and Risk-Adjusted Returns to Trading Strategies
Strategy 1 forms portfolios based simply on the prior month return. P1 (P10) has the lowest (highest) prior-month returns and is predicted to perform best (worst). Strategy 2 predicts onemonth-ahead stock returns using autocorrelations estimated by model (1). Portfolios are formed with P1 (P10) having the highest (lowest) predicted returns. Market-model and two-factor abnormal returns are estimated using models (2) and (3) The net effect of these two issues on autocorrelations is impossible to determine given the missing data. Accordingly, we can only conjecture that the estimated autocorrelations reported in tables 1 and 2 may not be representative of the entire population. The estimates do, however, represent stocks that matter-those that trade frequently (i.e. at least once a month).
While the autocorrelation estimates are of interest for comparison with international findings, the more important issue is the magnitude of profits to trading strategies. On this front, we are better able to assess the impact of survivorship bias. Note that the 'previous 12 month' filter does not impart a survivorship bias on the trading profits. It is perfectly valid to implement a trading strategy that utilises currently available information (e.g. the subset of stocks that have a series of valid returns leading up to today). However, the profits in table 3 do suffer from a look-ahead bias-stocks included in a trading strategy at time t must have a valid return in month t + 1.
To assess the magnitude (if any) of the survivorship bias on trading profits, the following exercise is undertaken. To maintain comparability with table 3 results, the population of stocks is again filtered by selecting only those stocks at month t with valid returns in month t, as well as in the prior 12 months. In this case, however, no looking ahead to the next month is undertaken. Stocks are allocated to one of ten portfolios based on either strategy 1 (using just prior month return) or strategy 2 (using the estimated autocorrelation structure from the previous 12 monthly returns).
Summary statistics (not reported) show that, on average, 98.4% of firm-month observations have a valid return in the following month.
9 This follows naturally from the 'previous 12 month' filter which eliminates stocks with a propensity not to trade. Month t + 1 delistings are rare in the selected sample and only 1.3% of observations do not trade in the following month. Taken together, these results hint that the impact of missing returns on trading profits will not be severe.
To assess the impact of nontrading on profits, two approaches are explored. First, a conservative approach assigns month t + 1 return of -100% to delisting stocks, and a zero return to nontrading stocks.
10 Alternatively, the second approach assigns a month t + 1 return of -100% to every stock that does not trade in the following month. While this is ultra conservative, it puts a bound on the minimum trading profit.
Results from the first approach (not shown) are similar to table 3. Portfolio 1 earns monthly abnormal returns of around 5% and 3% under strategy 1 and strategy 2 respectively. Profits to the zero-cost arbitrage portfolio are almost identical to table 3. These findings are not surprising given that delisting is so rare in the sample.
Results from the ultra-conservative approach are reported in table 4. The zerocost arbitrage portfolios earn monthly abnormal returns around 5.60% and 3.00% under strategies 1 and 2 respectively. These are likely to be overstated since the assignment of -100% returns to all nontrading stocks generates large negative returns to P10 (in which we have a short position). Regardless, under strategy 1 (based on prior month return), P1 still earns raw returns of 4.93% and abnormal returns of around 3% per month.
In summary, the analysis of potential survivorship bias in results from section 3 suggests that, even after making ultra-conservative assumptions about the fate of stocks with missing returns, profits remain for trading strategies based on the prior month return.
9. All results discussed, but not reported, are included in an appendix to the paper that can be downloaded from the corresponding author's website. 10. This 'conservative' approach is only a loose attempt to quantify the impact of missing returns. For example, delisting stocks may have been subject to takeover at a significant premium. For stocks with missing returns in month t + 1, the next price at which they trade is identified and compared to the month t price. The subsequent price was higher (lower) in 36% (64%) of cases. While this is not necessarily indicative of negative returns on average, it does suggest assigning zero returns to missing observations is a rough approximation. Ultra-conservative returns to tradings strategies follow from assuming −100% return when stocks either delist or do not trade in the month of interest. Strategy 1 forms portfolios based simply on the prior month return. P1 (P10) has the lowest (highest) prior-month returns and is predicted to perform best (worst). Strategy 2 predicts one-month-ahead stock returns using autocorrelations estimated by model (1). Portfolios are formed with P1 (P10) having the highest (lowest) predicted returns. Market-model and two-factor abnormal returns are estimated using models (2) and (3) respectively. t-statistics, reported in parentheses, are calculated using heteroscedasticity-andautocorrelation consistent standard errors. 
Microstructure Problems
It is well-known that non-synchronous trading induces spurious negative autocorrelation in individual stock returns (Scholes & Williams 1977; Lo & MacKinlay 1990) . Australian equities are particularly susceptible to this problem, with the market dominated by a handful of large stocks, while the vast majority of stocks have relatively small market capitalisations. As at December 2000, there were 1405 stocks listed on the Australian Stock Exchange. The five largest stocks comprise 27% of the total market capitalisation. Similarly, the top 20 and top 100 comprise 53% and 83% of the total market capitalisation respectively.
By global standards, Australian equities are also thinly traded. By using the AGSM monthly database, our trading strategies implicitly assume trades can be executed at the month end. It is likely, however, that many of the stocks included in our strategies could not have been traded as required at this time.
Finally, Blume and Stambaugh (1983) and Roll (1984) demonstrate that bidask spreads can induce a spurious negative first-order autocorrelation in returns which is a positive function of the magnitude of the spread. Bid-ask bounce is more severe for low-price stocks where spreads are relatively wider. Several factors mitigate the likely influence of bid-ask bounce in our results. First, unlike the US market which (until recently) employed a tick size of one-eighth of a dollar, the Australian market quotes prices in cents resulting in narrow spreads.
11 Second, the AGSM database contains only monthly returns; problems relating to bid-ask bounce are more prevalent using high-frequency data (such as daily returns).
To assess the susceptibility of our results to these market-microstructure problems, table 5 reports summary statistics for the stocks included in our trading strategies. Portfolio P1, which exhibits the largest return in table 3, clearly comprises extremely small stocks in terms of both market capitalisation and share price. This fact heightens our suspicion that apparent trading profits may have microstructure explanations. P1 stocks also have relatively high systematic risk. To assess the likely existence of nonsynchronous and thin trading, we compile a 'trading-date ratio' for each stock at each point in time. The AGSM database reports the date of the last trade in the month for each stock, along with the last 11. The tick size for most stocks is one cent, while for stocks under fifty cents, the tick size is half of one cent.
available trading date. We calculate the trading ratio as the former divided by the latter. A ratio of unity indicates the stock traded on the last day of the month. 12 The lower the ratio, the more stale the price information.
The average trading-date ratios (not shown) cluster in a range from 0.9541 to 0.9737, with no systematic differences in trading ratios across the portfolios. While the average ratio might appear to be high for portfolios containing predominantly small stocks, our data selection involves an implicit filter against infrequentlytraded stocks-stocks are required to have valid return data in the current month and 12 lagged months.
While the high ratios indicate a tendency of stocks to trade towards the end of the month, a large number of stocks do not trade on the final day. Of the full sample (163,018 firm months), a final-day trade occurs for only 127,953 firmmonths. Since our trading strategies rely on the ability to close-out positions on the last day of the month, questions exist over the authenticity of reported returns. Returns to trading strategies are re-calculated using only observations with tradingdate ratio equal to unity (i.e. stocks that traded on the final day of the month). The results (not shown) do not differ materially; returns to P1 and the arbitrage portfolio remain high.
While the likely spurious effects of infrequent trading appear minimal, questions over thin trading remain. The AGSM database does not report the volume of trading; therefore, even if small stocks trade at the end of the month, there may be insufficient volume to effectively implement our trading strategies. In order to control for the impact of thin trading, we partition the sample into two groups: the Top200 stocks by market capitalisation, and the non-Top200 stocks.
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Since the ASX/S&P200 index is the benchmark for many fund managers, thin trading problems are minimal for Top200 stocks.
Tables 6 and 7 report returns to trading strategies for the Top200 and nonTop200 stocks respectively. There are several noticeable features. First, the average raw returns to Top200 stocks are considerably smaller than non-Top200 stocks. Returns to the latter group may be influenced by the size effect and/or the microstructure problems mentioned above. For Top200 stocks, little evidence of economically significant trading profits remains. Using either the market-model or two-factor model, abnormal returns to nearly all portfolios are insignificantly different from zero. In addition, the zero-cost arbitrage portfolio is insignificant. Non-Top200 stocks (table 7) exhibit large abnormal returns and arbitrage-portfolio returns over 8% (strategy 1) and 4% (strategy 2).
In conclusion, this analysis strongly suggests that trading strategies based on the autocorrelation structure of returns are unlikely to generate abnormal returns for the Top200 stocks. Non-Top200 stocks appear to generate significant profits, but it is unclear whether these stocks exhibit sufficient trading volumes to capture these profits. This group of stocks is also susceptible to spurious returns from marketmicrostructure related issues.
12. Since the AGSM database reports monthly data, we cannot determine the time of the trade. Nevertheless, the trading ratio gives some indication of trading frequency. 13. We are again grateful to the referee for suggesting this procedure. An alternate control for thin trading is to eliminate all stocks with share price less than the median price. Results (not shown) are similar to those reported here-apparent trading profits disappear after removing small stocks. Strategy 1 forms portfolios based simply on the prior month return. P1 (P10) has the lowest (highest) prior-month returns and is predicted to perform best (worst). Strategy 2 predicts onemonth-ahead stock returns using autocorrelations estimated by model (1). Portfolios are formed with P1 (P10) having the highest (lowest) predicted returns. Market-model and two-factor abnormal returns are estimated using models (2) and (3) respectively. t-statistics, reported in parentheses, are calculated using heteroscedasticity-and-autocorrelation consistent standard errors. 
Conclusions
This paper examines the significance of return autocorrelations on individual Australian stocks from both statistical and economic perspectives. Prior Australian research focuses on the statistical significance of autocorrelations for market indices and industry groups, and does not examine economic significance. There are several major findings. Based on the full sample, the first-order autocorrelation of individual stock returns is large and negative. This pattern persists throughout the year, but is more pronounced in July, suggesting a taxselling explanation. Negative first-order autocorrelation is also more pronounced for small-to medium-sized firms, while larger firms display positive autocorrelation at lags out to twelve months. Strategy 1 forms portfolios based simply on the prior month return. P1 (P10) has the lowest (highest) prior-month returns and is predicted to perform best (worst). Strategy 2 predicts onemonth-ahead stock returns using autocorrelations estimated by model (1). Portfolios are formed with P1 (P10) having the highest (lowest) predicted returns. Market-model and two-factor abnormal returns are estimated using models (2) and (3) respectively. t-statistics, reported in parentheses, are calculated using heteroscedasticity-and-autocorrelation consistent standard errors. Also based on the full sample, the results suggest that the autocorrelations are economically significant. Two investment strategies based on observed autocorrelations appear to yield significant risk-adjusted returns. Further analysis of portfolio composition, however, highlights that stocks involved in the trading strategies (especially P1 and P10) are small capitalisation and low-price stocks. This raises questions of whether the documented autocorrelations are affected by spurious returns induced by market-microstructure problems, and whether there is sufficient trading volume in these stocks to implement trading strategies.
To mitigate problems related to non-synchronous trading, bid-ask bounce, and thin trading, the sample is partitioned by market capitalisation into Top200 stocks (which are heavily traded and unlikely to suffer from microstructure problems) and non-Top200 stocks. The results based on this partitioning are striking. Raw returns to Top200 stocks are significantly lower and trading strategies show no evidence of abnormal profits. In contrast, trading strategies using non-Top200 stocks continue to show large returns (both raw and risk-adjusted).
We remain sceptical that profits of this magnitude could be realised on nonTop200 stocks. Further research on this issue using a more sophisticated database is warranted. For example, an 'implementability' filter using trading volume data around the month end might be useful. A recent paper by Demir, Muthuswamy, and Walter (2003) provides several other insightful examples of how the profits to genuinely-implementable momentum trading strategies can be measured. Many fruitful avenues for further analysis of momentum trading remain. 
